Can Strong Creditors Inhibit Entrepreneurial Activity? (with Nuri Ersahin and Rustom Irani) Revise & Resubmit, Review of Financial Studies
We examine startup entry and exit activity following the staggered adoption of modern-day fraudulent transfer laws in the United States. These laws strengthen unsecured creditors’ rights and are particularly important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets commingle with the firm’s. Using administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document declines in startup entry, churning among entrants, and closures of existing firms after these laws pass. Firm financial data shows that entrepreneurs lower leverage by reducing unsecured credit. Our results suggest that excessive creditor rights can reduce entrepreneurs’ appetite for risk, thereby slowing down the extensive margin process of reallocating resources from failing to new businesses.
Unearthing Zombies: Regulatory Intervention to Aid Legal Reform (with Nirupama Kulkarni, S. K. Ritadhi, and Siddharth Vij)
Poor bankruptcy laws can result in entrenched systems of evergreening in developing countries. We exploit, as a natural experiment, the introduction of a new bankruptcy law in India and examine the likelihood of loans being classified as distressed, a precursor to starting bankruptcy proceedings. We find that the bankruptcy law had only a limited impact on banks classifying loans as delinquent, and this impact was particularly muted for weaker banks. A subsequent regulatory intervention implemented by the Reserve Bank of India removed lender discretion in recognizing loans as distressed, and in initiating subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. The regulatory intervention resulted in a 60 percent increase in recognition of distressed assets, though with more muted effects in weaker banks. As a result, credit was reallocated away from distressed firms and towards investment-grade firms. Overall, our results suggest that bank health is an important determinant of the effectiveness of bankruptcy reform, and regulatory intervention can successfully overcome poor enforcement arising from a weakly capitalized banking sector.
Common Ownership and Startup Growth (with Ofer Eldar and Jillian P. Grennan)
We examine whether and to what extent a corporation’s ability to waive the corporate opportunity doctrine, which constrains directors from following conflicted interests, helps it to raise capital. We use the staggered adoption of state legislation to identify if this weaker form of governance can be a tool for attracting venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) investment. We find that this ability to customize corporate governance is associated with more deals, larger deal values, and more late-stage investments. The capital is accompanied by more directorships for VC and PE investors and a thickening of those investors’ overall networks among firms in treated states. These findings challenge the received wisdom that weak governance is bad.
How Do Firms Use Chapter 11? A Taxonomy
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code has been in place for four decades. In this time, a sophisticated cast of distress market participants has arisen and courts have worked to achieve transparency and verifiability in asset valuation. It is a puzzle, therefore, that corporations in the U.S. should file for bankruptcy at all. This paper constructs an empirical taxonomy of large Chapter 11 debtors based on their objectives and preparation at the time of filing. Approximately two thirds of the firms in the sample set out to reorganize while the remaining third aim to sell substantially all of their assets, either as a going concern or in liquidation. Nearly 60% of firms enter bankruptcy having undergone a thorough marketing of their assets or with a pre-arranged plan of reorganization in place. These findings suggest that, while the majority of large corporations use Chapter 11 to cure hold-outs or capture direct financial benefits afforded by the Bankruptcy Code, some cases may still involve strategic gaming and the exploitation of informational frictions.
Unsecured Creditor Control in Chapter 11
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, certain control rights are assigned to an official committee of unsecured creditors. This paper investigates the impact of the official committee on Chapter 11 outcomes using a novel dataset built from raw court documents that covers all cases from 2004-2014 with over $10 million in assets. We find that the existence of an official committee is associated with a 7-11% increase in the likelihood that the firm is acquired. It also leads to a reduction in the amount of time spent in bankruptcy, particularly for firms that end up acquired. In addition to the main results, we also find that membership composition matters and that certain influential creditors are associated with higher rates of reorganization when they are present on the official committee.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
Negotiation and Control in Chapter 11
Restructuring Support Agreements: An Empirical Analysis (with Anthony J. Casey and Frederick Tung)
FOSTERing a New Approach to Corporate Risk Management (with Lee Pinkowitz and Rohan Williamson)
Multinational Bankruptcy (with James Albertus, Sreedhar Bharath, and Edith Hotchkiss)
The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition with Jeffrey Miron (2010)
State and federal governments in the United States face massive looming fiscal deficits. One policy change that can reduce deficits is ending the drug war. Legalization means reduced expenditure on enforcement and an increase in tax revenue from legalized sales. This report estimates that legalizing drugs would save roughly $41.3 billion per year in government expenditure on enforcement of prohibition. Of these savings, $25.7 billion would accrue to state and local governments, while $15.6 billion would accrue to the federal government. Approximately $8.7 billion of the savings would result from legalization of marijuana and $32.6 billion from legalization of other drugs. The report also estimates that drug legalization would yield tax revenue of $46.7 billion annually, assuming legal drugs were taxed at rates comparable to those on alcohol and tobacco. Approximately $8.7 billion of this revenue would result from legalization of marijuana and $38.0 billion from legalization of other drugs.